Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition by Ayala-López, Saray
© 2015 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION   ISSN 2155-9708
FROM THE EDITOR 
Margaret A. Crouch 
ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 
NEWS FROM THE CSW 
ARTICLES 
Saray Ayala 
Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker 
Condition 
Megan M. Burke 
Specters of Violence 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Shelley M. Park: Mothering Queerly, 
Queering Motherhood 
Reviewed by Sarah LaChance Adams 
Feminism and Philosophy
NEWSLETTER  |  The American Philosophical Association
VOLUME 14   |   NUMBER 2 SPRING 2015
SPRING 2015    VOLUME 14  |  NUMBER 2
 
 
 
Sarah LaChance Adams: Mad Mothers,
Bad Mothers, and What a “Good” Mother 
Would Do: The Ethics of Ambivalence 
Reviewed by Dana Belu 
Clara Fischer: Gendered Readings of 
Change: A Feminist-Pragmatist Approach 
Reviewed by Marilyn Fischer 
Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and 
Susan Dodds (eds.): Vulnerability: New 
Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy 
Reviewed by Erinn Gilson 
Margaret R. Holmgren: Forgiveness and 
Retribution: Responding to Wrongdoing 
Reviewed by Hailey Huget 
Susanne Lettow (ed.): Reproduction, Race,
and Gender in Philosophy and the Early 
Life Sciences 
Reviewed by Mark William Westmoreland 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
CONTRIBUTORS 
Feminism and Philosophy
MARGARET A. CROUCH, EDITOR    VOLUME 14  |  NUMBER 2  |  SPRING 2015
APA NEWSLETTER ON
 
 
 
 
FROM THE EDITOR 
Margaret A. Crouch 
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
The issue of the newsletter includes two articles and a 
significant number of book reviews. My thanks to all those 
who submitted articles, reviewed books, and to those who 
acted as reviewers of submissions for this issue. 
Saray Ayala writes on a topic that has not received much 
attention in her essay “Philosophy and the Non-Native 
Speaker Condition.” Ayala demonstrates that biases 
against accented English by native English speakers have 
the same sorts of effects on perceptions of philosophers’ 
competence as biases against gender or ethnicity. 
Furthermore, there are also implicit biases against those 
who speak accented English. In addition to the harms to 
the individual that can result from such biases, Ayala argues 
that there are also harms to philosophy. Because the views 
of those with accented English receive less credibility from 
their audience, the content of their work may not have 
the influence it could otherwise have on the discipline 
of philosophy. This impoverishes philosophy, not only 
because the views of individuals are not taken up, but also 
because there are reasons to think that different languages 
might offer different intuitions and perspectives. Ayala’s 
essay is a wonderful introduction to this topic. She provides 
important empirical data, as well as suggestions for how to 
eliminate the effects of this bias. The recent newsletter on 
diversity in philosophy offered additional ways of correcting 
for bias against non-native English speakers. 
Megan M. Burke’s Specters of Violence explores the idea 
that sexual violence haunts the lived experience of women 
and girls, and how this haunting presence affects, in 
particular, how they experience freedom. Burke provides 
a profound analysis of “the existential harm of rape 
culture and how rape culture is integral to the production 
of feminine subjectivity.” In her conclusion, she offers 
suggestions for getting rid of these specters. For anyone 
who has experienced gendered or sexual violence, she 
provides a way of understanding why one feels as one 
does, and what it means for how one lives one’s life. She 
also offers hope. 
ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored 
by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The 
newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent 
philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None 
of the varied philosophical views presented by authors 
of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any 
or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of 
Women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does 
the committee advocate any particular type of feminist 
philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical 
attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of 
gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration. 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND
INFORMATION
1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish 
information about the status of women in philosophy 
and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more 
widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of 
recent developments in feminist philosophy and related 
work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book 
reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the 
traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on 
feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about 
the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. 
Articles submitted to the newsletter should be limited 
to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA 
guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit 
essays electronically to the editor. All manuscripts should 
be prepared for anonymous review. Each submission shall 
be sent to two reviewers. Reviews will be shared with 
authors. References should follow The Chicago Manual of 
Style. 
2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a 
book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, please 
have your publisher send us a copy of your book. Each call 
for papers also includes a list of books for possible review. 
To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), 
please send the editor a CV and letter of interest, including 
mention of your areas of research and teaching. 
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3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, 
suggestions, books, and other communications to the 
editor, Dr. Margaret A. Crouch, at mcrouch@emich.edu. 
4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for spring issues 
are due by the preceding November 1; submissions for fall 
issues are due by the preceding April 1. 
NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
NEW EDITOR FOR THE NEWSLETTER ON
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 
Margaret Crouch, who has for many years served the 
newsletter well and faithfully, is stepping down as editor of 
the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy after the 
fall 2015 issue. Beginning with the spring 2016 issue, the 
new editor will be Serena Parekh (Northeastern University). 
DIVERSITY CONFERENCE 
Plans for the Diversity Conference, to be held May 28 to 
May 30, 2015, at Villanova University, are now complete. 
The unusually rich program, sponsored jointly by Hypatia
and CSW, can be found at http://www1.villanova.edu/ 
villanova/artsci/hypatiaconference/program.html. 
Additional features of the conference include professional
workshops on publishing feminist philosophy, a workshop
on sexual harassment and bystander training, and the APA/ 
CSW site visit training workshop (May 31). Modest travel
grants are available for presenters who could not otherwise
attend. Many thanks to those of you who gave so generously
to make the conference and training programs possible. 
SITE VISIT PROGRAM 
Now in its second year, the Site Visit Program continues 
to do its important work. The directors of the program are 
reminding all parties to these visits that Site Visitors are not 
Title IX Investigators, as a confusion over this has caused 
a problem in the past. Two site visits were conducted in 
the fall of 2014 and two more are scheduled for spring 
2015. The directors of the program are Carla Fehr, Peggy 
DesAutels, and Sally Haslanger, and CSW has just approved 
the addition of an associate director. 
CSW WEBSITE 
The CSW website, at http://www.apaonlinecsw.org/, 
continues to feature bimonthly profiles of women 
philosophers. Links to excellent resources include one to 
a database on teaching with articles and readings, another 
to the crowd-sourced directory of women philosophers, 
and one to the APA ombudsperson for nondiscrimination, 
who will receive complaints of discrimination and, where 
possible, serve as a resource to APA members regarding 
such complaints. 
TASK FORCE ON INCLUSIVENESS 
The CSW, in response to a suggestion from Kathryn Pogin, 
has asked the Task Force on Inclusiveness to recommend 
that the APA adopt a general policy against bullying. Such 
incidents often occur via social media sites, philosophy 
blogs, and so on, where victims cannot readily control 
what is said about them, and CSW endorsed the thought 
that bullying and harassment in all forms merit the APA’s 
concern. 
CSW SESSIONS AT APA MEETINGS 
The CSW-sponsored sessions at APA meetings held in 2014-
2015 were well attended and well received. 
Eastern Division: Informational Session on the Site Visit 
Program 
Sally Haslanger
Valerie Hardcastle 
Central Division: Best Practices in Publishing 
Kieran Healey 
“Gender and Citation Patterns in Generalist Philosophy 
Journals, 1993–2013” 
Sally Scholz 
“Referees, Gender Neutrality, and Diversity in Publishing 
Feminist Philosophy” 
Colin Allen 
“Editorial Strategies Concerning the Participation of Women 
at the SEP” 
Due to faulty communication between the Pacific Division 
program coordinators and CSW, the Pacific Division session 
on how to do a climate survey was not scheduled. Steps 
have been taken to prevent this problem in the future. 
ARTICLES 
Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker 
Condition 
Saray Ayala 
SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY 
INTRODUCTION 
In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that 
has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in 
my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional 
practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts 
for social justice. I am referring to the way in which being 
a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice 
of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers 
are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced 
perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes 
wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and 
biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to 
expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be 
free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this 
prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who 
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are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for 
it might make us miss important things that could improve 
philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive 
to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and 
for the sake of doing better philosophy. 
1. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON BIASED
PERCEPTION OF NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS 
Many of us might recognize the following scenario: at a 
philosophy conference at which English is the main or 
only official language (a very common thing nowadays in 
many countries, including those with an official language 
other than English), a presenter starts giving a talk, and the 
audience notices that the speaker’s English is accented. At 
the beginning they might find it difficult to understand what 
the speaker is saying, which can be frustrating. However, 
unless the speaker’s command of English is extremely poor, 
in less than a minute of exposure their perceptual system 
is likely to adapt to the speaker’s accented pronunciation 
completely, eliminating the initial decrease in processing 
speed (Clarke and Garrett 2004) and allowing them to 
engage fully with the content of the talk. Nevertheless, by 
then, part of the audience might disregard the speaker as 
incompetent and stop attending to the talk.
This scenario does not paint an unrealistically pessimistic 
picture. A large body of research in psychology shows that 
non-native accent can have profound detrimental effects 
on perception of abilities and competence. Non-native 
speakers are generally perceived as less credible and skilled 
(Brown, Giles, and Thakerar 1985; Giles 1973), as having 
lower status (Nesdale and Rooney 1996; Ryan and Carranza 
1977), as being less intelligent (Bradac 1990; Lindemann 
2003), and as being less competent (Boyd 2003).2 Similar 
to the gender bias that Steinpress, Anders, & Ritzke (1999) 
found in evaluations of the curriculum vitae of female 
versus male applicants,3 Huang, Frideger, and Pearce 
(2013) documented a bias against non-native speakers 
in evaluations of applicants for a managerial position. 
Participants examined resumes and listened to recorded 
interviews with fictitious candidates speaking English with 
native or non-native accent. The resumes were the same 
across conditions, and interviews followed identical scripts. 
The only difference was the applicant’s accent. Strikingly, 
participants were significantly more likely to recommend 
hiring the native speaker than the non-native speaker. 
This effect held regardless of the perceived race of the 
candidate (half of the resumes included a photograph of 
an Asian male, who “spoke” either with a native accent 
or Japanese accent during the interview; the other half of 
the resumes showed a photograph of a white male who 
“spoke” either with a native or Russian accent during the 
interview). Another line of research suggests that one does 
not even need to embrace an explicit bias against accented 
English or foreigners to exhibit such biased treatment. 
As happens with gender and racial biases, prejudiced 
perception might be a result of implicit bias. Pantos and 
Perkins (2012) measured explicit and implicit attitudes of 
graduate and undergraduate students in the United States 
towards the U.S. accent and foreign accents using the 
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al. 1998) and self 
reports. Unsurprisingly, explicit and implicit attitudes to 
accented speech diverged: while participants reported a 
pro-foreign attitude, their implicit attitude favored the U.S. 
accent. 
It is important to mention that accent is not necessarily 
correlated with a deficient command of the language. 
Accent is importantly different from language competence 
and fluency. Speaking with a non-native accent might simply 
consist of keeping the phonology (including intonation) of 
one’s native language while having a perfect command of 
the second language (Giles 1970). This raises a question of 
how justified “accent penalties” are for otherwise proficient 
speakers.
A number of studies make it evident that a non-negligible 
part of the problem stems from biased perception, rather 
than from direct communication impediments caused 
by accented speech. For example, Rubin and colleagues 
demonstrated that even when listeners wrongly believe 
that the speaker is a non-native, they start reporting 
hearing highly accented speech, and their listening 
comprehension drops significantly (Rubin 2002). Listeners’ 
attitudes to accented speech appear to play an important 
role. Lindemann (2002; reviewed in Lindemann 2011) 
measured attitudes of native-speaking U.S. college 
students towards Korean-accented English; the students 
were subsequently paired with Korean-accented speakers 
who had to communicate how to draw a route on a map 
without using gestures. Both the perception of the success 
of the communication and the success itself (measured by 
how accurately the native speaker listener drew the route 
on the map following the non-native speaker’s instructions) 
were influenced by native speakers’ attitudes towards their 
non-native partners. Participants with positive attitudes 
were more likely to succeed on the task than participants 
with negative attitudes, even though both groups received 
instructions from the same Korean-accented speakers. 
Most strikingly, even though most of the participants with 
negative attitudes did succeed on the task, none of them 
rated the communication as successful! Clearly something 
in common is going on in all of these cases: it is not the 
accent causing trouble, but the participants’ beliefs about 
it. 
Going back to our initial scenario, of course people in 
the audience at the philosophy conference who chose to 
“tune out” and/or judged the non-native speaker presenter 
as incompetent might have been responding to the 
presenter’s lack of communicative skills, rather than their 
accent. Although this is definitely a possibility, the research 
reviewed above suggests that instead of assuming that the 
audience had good reasons for their judgment, it could be 
illuminating to consider the possibility that they might have 
done so due to (possibly implicit) bias against non-native 
speech. 
The prejudiced perception of non-native speakers has 
many real consequences. Documented disadvantages 
range from discrimination in employment (in the form 
of lower earnings (Davila, Bohara, and Saenz 1993) and 
lower-status positions (Bradac and Wisegarver 1984)), 
to discrimination in housing (Zhao, Ondrich, and Yinger 
2006). Frumkin (2007) suggests that non-native accent 
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could even deflate credibility granted to eyewitnesses (see 
Gluszek and Dovidio 2010 for a review). What could biased 
perception be doing to non-native philosophers? 
2. ACCENT, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND EPISTEMIC
INJUSTICE 
Accent is one of the first cues that listeners get about a 
speaker’s social identity. According to the Linguistic 
Stereotyping hypothesis (Bradac, Cargile, and Hallett 
2001), accent carries information about the speaker that 
might activate stereotypes about non-native speakers 
in general (e.g., stereotypes about immigrants, see 
Lindemann 2003; Ryan 1983), or about a specific group the 
speaker is assumed to belong to (Giles, Williams, Mackie, 
and Rosselli 1995; Irvine and Gal 2000; Lindemann 2003; 
Nesdale and Rooney 1996), or both (Hosoda et al. 2007). 
For example, Hispanic-accented English may activate 
stereotypes associated with the Hispanic identity or with 
the very category of immigrants, or both.4 
In contrast to clearly morally problematic practices of 
profiling speakers on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, 
gender, sexual orientation, ability, or class, accent provides 
a surreptitious way to profile speakers that is generally 
seen as less morally problematic (Lippi-Green 1997). One 
illustration of this phenomenon can be found in jokes 
and comments about someone’s accent: in contrast to 
equivalent comments about, e.g., race, many accent-
related comments are generally considered appropriate. 
But given the association between perceived accent and 
assumed social identity, accent perception is interestingly 
and problematically related to forms of injustice associated 
with social identity. Accent might be a mediator for some 
kinds of identity discrimination (e.g., discrimination based 
on immigration status, or on membership in other socially 
marked groups associated with certain accents or language 
styles). The negative perception of non-native speakers, in 
particular attributing to them deflated levels of credibility, 
sets the stage for a particular kind of injustice of special 
relevance to the philosophy profession, i.e., epistemic 
injustice. 
Systematically attributing a deflated level of credibility to 
a speaker as a consequence of a prejudiced perception of 
his or her identity can be understood as a case of persistent 
testimonial injustice, a subcategory of epistemic injustice 
(Fricker 2007). Independently of the bad consequences 
this might have, it is wrong to systematically dismiss the 
strength of someone’s claims on the basis of their perceived 
social identity. The speaker (e.g., the non-native presenter 
in our example, or a non-native-speaking instructor teaching 
a class) is systematically granted insufficient credibility, 
and is excluded from the community of epistemic trust, 
that is, from the community of knowers and knowledge-
providers.5 I rely on Miranda Fricker’s analysis of the harms 
of testimonial injustice, and specifically on her distinction 
between a primary and a secondary harm (ibid., chapter 
2, section 2.3). Independently of the secondary harms 
that this exclusion might cause to the non-native speaker 
(e.g., reducing their chances to get a job given their 
perceived incompetence at an interview; increasing the 
chances of getting negative student evaluations due to the 
students’ impression of instructor’s lacking skills;6 and as a 
predictable consequence of the above, making them lose 
confidence in their intellectual abilities), a primary harm is 
the very harm of the non-native speaker being wronged 
in their capacity as a giver of knowledge. And this is bad 
enough, even if no other damage follows. 
Being discarded on the grounds of being unable to 
transmit knowledge is bad in all domains, but perhaps 
especially bad in philosophy, where there’s no recourse to 
data from an experiment that could support the soundness 
of one’s reasoning. Compared to data-based disciplines, in 
philosophy the credibility of a speaker relies more strongly 
on how convincing they sound. If you are not granted a 
minimal starting level of credibility (if you are excluded 
from the very beginning from the community of bearers 
of philosophical knowledge), your intervention will likely 
sound less convincing than it would have been had you 
started from a higher position on the credibility scale. If 
we accept the results of the aforementioned research, 
perceived convincingness is positively correlated with 
perceived nativeness of speech. When a speaker can only 
rely on how convincing they sound, rather than on external 
resources lending credibility to their intervention, a non-
native speaker has to work extra to make a contribution that 
would be seen as valuable. 
There are other particularities of the philosophy discipline
that amplify the effects of prejudiced perception of non-
native speakers. In philosophy, language is not only a
tool to analyze problems and a means of expression, as
it is in other disciplines, neither is it just a platform to
sell your ideas, as it happens in business. In philosophy,
language is often the subject matter itself. It is reasonable
to think that if the perceived quality of your work tracks,
among other things, your perceived command of a
language, a non-native-speaking philosopher working
on language is under special scrutiny. The research
showing that judgments about a speaker’s language
proficiency are affected by listeners’ negative attitudes
towards non-native accent and non-native speakers
(Kang and Rubin 2009; Lindemann 2003) suggests this
scrutiny might be an unfair extra demand due to bias
against non-native accent, and not (always) the result of
an unbiased evaluation of the speaker’s actual command
of the language. In addition to the above, an eloquent
expression of an argument or criticism is a sine qua non
to be considered a good philosopher. If your accent or
your command of English adds noise to your intervention
and promotes prejudiced perception, your standing as a
philosopher is jeopardized. 
We might still resist the idea that a non-native accent is 
really what explains audience’s negative judgment about 
the (apparently incompetent) speaker in our example. 
Academics don’t care about other academics’ personal 
particularities, and look solely at their research and the quality 
of their ideas. However, when it comes to implicit biases, 
academics do not fare any better than non-academics (see, 
e.g., Steinpreis et al. 1999; Wenneras and Wold, 1997; Trix 
and Psenka 2003). Even though philosophers are trained in 
critical thinking, it does not prevent us from exhibiting sex/ 
gender, race, ability, class, or nationality biases, to name 
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but a few, given that we also have ideologies, unconscious 
processes, and live in a society with strong schemas around 
sex/gender, race, ability, class, and nationality that guide 
our behavior and beliefs, not only at home but also at work. 
Philosophical practice is not at all free of the biggest evils 
of our society. Different kinds of discrimination abound in 
our departments, mostly unrecognized and often difficult 
to pin down. Thus, it seems we have good reasons to 
expect prejudiced perception of non-native speakers to be 
also present in the philosophical practice. 
Complicating the story, philosophers who are non-native 
speakers of English are often affiliated with or received 
their B.A. or Ph.D. education in little-known schools. The 
fact that many of us are completely unfamiliar with these 
institutions might make us skeptical about their reputation. 
In the era of information, one might wonder, why haven’t 
I heard already about this school? Perhaps because 
there is nothing interesting to hear about, one might 
reason, relying on the recognition heuristic. Whether we 
are aware of it or not, we are likely to react to unknown 
institutions with caution, starting with a default approach 
of suspicion. As if, somehow, there is a burden on the 
philosopher associated with such an institution to prove 
that they are philosophically trustworthy, something we 
do not demand from a person affiliated with a well-known 
school or who received their education there. If, back in 
our example, the name tag of the presenter with an accent 
reads “Harvard,” our patience with the speaker’s accent will 
probably stretch, even if only a little bit, for the institution’s 
reputation functions as a warranty of competence and the 
promise that our time won’t be wasted. If, however, we 
read the name of some unknown university, our patience 
probably shrinks. Now we don’t have additional reasons to 
trust the speaker’s capacities and everything is left to the 
quality of their intervention, which, if I am right, is distorted 
by our perception of their accent. Now the standard is 
higher: it must be a superb intervention to override the 
effects of their accent and suspicious affiliation. In spite of 
knowing that competent philosophers are everywhere, not 
only in a few well-known institutions, we fall victims to the 
“big name” effect.7 It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish 
between the effects of association with foreign, small, 
or unknown institutions, and the effects of perceived 
non-native accent, for our doubts about the capacities of 
non-native philosophers might go hand in hand, at least 
sometimes, with our doubts about their (past or current) 
schools’ reputation. These effects might reinforce each 
other, or alleviate one another. Even when the big name 
effect boosts a philosopher’s perceived competence, the 
non-native effect can still play a role, perhaps weakening 
the perceived competence brought about by their 
affiliation, or even cancelling it out. 
So far I have only considered spoken English and perceived 
non-nativeness via detection of an accent. But it seems 
reasonable to think that when a philosopher’s written 
English reveals their non-native condition (not only due 
to grammatical mistakes, but also, and more importantly, 
to a unique or peculiar use of words, or lack of idiomatic 
expressions), the quality of their philosophical work might 
be undervalued by referees and editors, and by job and 
grant committee members. Written work appears to be 
even more susceptible to unfair judgment of quality, 
compared to spoken interventions, for when a written text 
somehow violates the expectations of the reader (due to 
some peculiar use of a verb or adjective, for example, or to 
some unusual grammatical structure), the likely immediate 
reaction is to become suspicious of its content. In a 
conversation, we can still ask the speaker or use cues other 
than the spoken words themselves to alleviate the feeling of 
uncertainty and suspiciousness. In a written text, however, 
there is no chance for clarification or compensation of 
that initial impression. And again, philosophy is especially 
vulnerable to these effects, given the role that clarity plays 
in our standards of what good philosophy is. If wording of 
a philosophical text raises doubts, it is likely going to be 
attributed to the low content quality and the author’s lack 
of philosophical competence. As we explain in more detail 
below, clarity demands by themselves should not, however, 
result in any disadvantage for non-native speakers. 
3. DO WE HAVE A NON-NATIVE SPEAKER
PROBLEM IN PHILOSOPHY? 
Whether or not we accept that non-native speakers are 
perceived in prejudiced ways in our profession, there are 
good reasons to look into the question. Recent data on the 
most cited philosophers and works in the philosophical 
community show an imbalance that calls for an explanation. 
Given that there are more people in the world with English 
as a second language than native speakers of English, and 
given the reasonable hypothesis that this is also the case 
for the philosophical community, it is at least surprising 
to find out that, according to these data, philosophers 
who are non-native speakers comprise a very (very!) small 
minority among the most cited contemporary authors. In 
a blog entry titled “Analytic Philosophy and the English 
Language,” Gabriele Contessa reports counts based on 
Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2010) list: out of the top 100 authors 
most cited in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
only six philosophers are non-native speakers of English. 
We get similar numbers when we look at the most cited 
philosophy works. A list posted by Kieran Healy (2013), and 
also analyzed by Gabriele Contessa, shows that out of the 
500 most cited works published between 1993 and 2013 in 
four of the top general philosophy journals (Philosophical 
Review, Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, and Mind), only 5.8 
percent are authored by non-native speakers. What is 
going on here? 
It seems possible to explain the aforementioned imbalance 
between native and non-native-speaking authors by 
appealing to writing style. It is needless to say that native 
language gives one more freedom and control over 
their written style. We are also likely to write in a more 
enchanting way when we write in our native language(s) 
(although we all know of a few remarkable cases of authors 
with exceptional style in a non-native language). And it 
makes sense to think that stylistic considerations play a big 
role in editors’ and referees’ decisions to reject or accept a 
paper for publication. Thus, it could be the case that non-
native speakers, with their perhaps “less stylish” writing, 
get rejected more often, even when content-wise their 
written work is equally valuable to a text with a better style 
written by a native speaker. This could also be the case for 
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general readers’ perception of the work’s quality and their 
willingness to engage with it. Thus, stylistic considerations 
might explain why there is an underrepresentation of non-
native speakers in the lists we mentioned above. If so, it is 
not clear that this should count as an unfair disadvantage 
(perhaps, rather, an unfortunate one). 
I suspect, however, that there is something else, besides 
stylistic considerations, that contributes to this imbalance. 
The writing style (a property of the author) interacts with 
expectations of the reader. When these expectations are 
violated by idiosyncratic and peculiar ways of expression 
(a likely product of combining eloquence in one’s native 
language with doing all of one’s professional academic 
writing in English), the reader can be taken aback. What 
could be taken as a virtue in a work of literature8 may 
interfere with the perceived flow of a philosophical text. 
Importantly, for this to happen we don’t even have to 
assume any prejudice on the part of the reader; mere 
unfamiliarity with the style and low predictability of the text 
can do the job. In this case, it is worth wondering if this 
should count as a morally relevant disadvantage for non-
native speakers, and as demanding adjustment from both 
parties. 
It is important to acknowledge that in the absence of data 
on how many non-native speakers actually submit works 
to those journals, we can’t make any strong claims about 
the origins of imbalance. But even if the relative rates of 
acceptance did not differ for native versus non-native 
speakers, the fact of underrepresentation of non-natives 
would still call for an explanation. It may help to draw a 
parallel with other cases of underrepresentation, for 
example, of women in science and technology careers, 
or, even closer to home, in the philosophy profession. 
Most would agree that low numbers of women applying 
for graduate degrees in these disciplines do not 
straightforwardly reflect women’s preferences and/or 
skills. Factors like a lack of encouragement and support, 
implicit bias, stereotype threat, and structural constrains 
limiting women’s choices throughout their lives play a 
big role and explain much of the underrepresentation we 
observe (see Antony 2012). Similarly, given the research on 
existing prejudices and discrimination against non-native 
speakers, we can, and should, consider the possibility that 
the non-native speaker condition might be a dimension of 
discrimination. 
In thinking about all this, at some point we arrive at the 
question of whether or not English is the appropriate, or an
appropriate language to do philosophy. Or a more modest 
and interesting question: In which ways is the kind of 
philosophy we do (in English) constrained in unrecognized 
ways by the English language? I am not saying that it is 
necessarily bad if most of our philosophy were specific to 
the English language. I do want to say that it is bad if that 
were the case and we don’t recognize it, for then many of 
us are doing bad philosophy (i.e., many of us would be 
doing English-constrained philosophy that aspires to be 
universal). 
It is true that when we do philosophy, our arguments 
often rely on our intuitions about expressions in English, 
i.e., whether or not an expression is widely used, whether 
it sounds awkward, whether it makes sense or not to say 
something in one way or another. It could be the case that 
when analyzing a concept, both as individual philosophers 
and as a community, we are not tackling the (universal) 
concept itself but how that concept behaves in English. 
Thus, our conclusions about the concept are importantly 
restricted to the English language, in a way that we might 
not recognize. Contessa offers an example suggesting that 
treatment of knowledge-how as a form of knowledge-that
might be a result of such English-constrained reasoning. 
In languages that descend from Latin, such as Spanish or 
Italian, there are two different lineages of words for the 
concept of knowledge (coming from the Latin “sapere” and 
“cognoscere”), and only one of them is used to express 
knowledge-how. Thus, native speakers of Spanish or Italian 
could propose a different relationship between knowledge-
how and knowledge-that which may or may not map well 
on the Anglophone’s treatment. Other linguistic differences 
potentially relevant for philosophical diversity abound: the 
distinction between Spanish “ser” (used with permanent 
properties) and “estar” (used with temporary properties) 
collapses in English into “to be” that features prominently 
in a wide range of philosophical discussions of object 
properties (and in Portuguese there is still a third option, 
“ficar,” that also gets translated as “to be”). Whenever we 
refer to naturally or unnaturally sounding statements in 
support of our philosophical claims, we either must assume 
universality of such judgments, or we may need to admit 
that we are talking about “naturalness for English-speaking 
philosophers” and restrict our claims accordingly. From the 
existence of these differences it does not follow that the 
philosophy we are doing, discussing, and publishing in 
English is necessarily constrained to the English language 
and fails to be universal (e.g., making accurate translations 
and testing our English-shaped intuitions against intuitions 
shaped by other languages should bridge the gap and 
solve the problem). It does follow, however, that we should 
be aware of the possibility. 
Another interesting question that would be worth exploring 
is how these differences among languages affect the kind 
of philosophy that non-native speakers do. It is true that 
many non-native philosophers not only discuss their work 
in English and publish in English but probably, depending 
on different contextual factors, also think in English. But 
likely for many it was not like that from the very beginning. 
If you are a non-native speaker of English, at some point in 
your career you stop reading translations into your native 
language and discussing philosophical arguments in your 
native language, and start reading English texts, attending 
philosophical events in English and writing, and discussing 
in English.9 I wonder if in adopting English as the language 
of their philosophical practice, non-native philosophers 
leave behind some intuitions and ways of reasoning that 
were perhaps shaped by their native language, and adopt 
new ones. And if so, are these new ways a blueprint of 
other native speakers’ intuitions and reasoning styles, or a 
hybrid of their previous native language-shaped ways and 
the new English-shaped ones? It seems that the market 
of philosophical ideas can only benefit from a variety 
of reasoning styles. Even if we do not accept the strong 
claim that different languages carry with them different 
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conceptual schemas that carve the world at different joints, 
we can still hold that our intuitions about how much sense 
an expression in English makes or how to understand a 
particular English sentence might be nevertheless affected 
by the languages we speak, and in particular by whether 
or not English is our native language. For example, a 
native speaker of English may have different intuitions 
about appropriateness of providing both teleological and 
mechanistic explanations in response to the “why”-question 
compared to a native-speaker of Spanish accustomed to 
selecting among different explanation-requests, “Para qué” 
(for what) and “Por qué” (due to what). 
If it is the case that different languages bring with them a 
broad variety of intuitions that can serve as analytical tools 
in our philosophical work, then non-native philosophers 
could enrich philosophy. This cannot happen if, however, 
non-native philosophers, for whatever reason, have little or 
no influence in the philosophical practice. 
Finally, we can ask: When we do philosophy in English, is 
linguistic competence a part of philosophical competence, 
or, rather, a prerequisite for expressing philosophical 
competence? Perhaps from the standpoint of some native 
speakers, it is the former. That is, you cannot be a good 
philosopher if you cannot communicate your ideas in a 
clear way, and clarity in communication requires linguistic 
competence. This alone does not have to create a problem 
for non-native speakers.10 As we already mentioned, 
accent does not necessarily conflict with clarity, and it 
is not a reliable indicator of poor linguistic competence. 
What can be problematic is how much weight is tacitly 
given to accent in our judgments of a speaker’s linguistic 
competence and fluency, and how much accent and other 
linguistic peculiarities proper of non-native speakers 
authors distort, via explicit or implicit negative attitudes 
towards accented English, listeners’ comprehension (or 
their impression of comprehension, as Lindemann’s (2002) 
results suggest). If readers’ and listeners’ expectations 
are tailored to a standard English language and violations 
of those expectations lead to negative judgments of a 
speaker’s clarity and linguistic competence (even though 
those violations wouldn’t conflict with clarity in case of an 
ideal unbiased audience on the receiving end), then we 
must accept that the measure of what a good philosopher 
is has a strong bias against many people, not only with a 
foreign accent but also with other non-foreign accents and 
styles (e.g., regional accents). 
Another question to raise about this belief (i.e., that linguistic 
competence is part of philosophical competence) has to do 
with its origin. Is it postulated a priori? Or is it a conclusion 
based on generalization of one’s interactions with non-
native speakers who didn’t cause a good impression? 
Could this impression be a result of prejudiced perception? 
If so, perhaps we need to reconsider our opinion about the 
role of linguistic competence. 
4. CONCLUSION AND PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL
FOR ACTION 
If, as suggested by the results in Huang et al. (2013), in 
the business sphere non-native entrepreneurs hit a glass 
ceiling because their ideas receive less financial support 
and they are less likely to be promoted to executive levels 
than native competitors, could non-native philosophers be 
facing similar barriers in their profession? 
There are good reasons (and some supporting research) 
to think that philosophers who are non-native speakers of 
English might be subject to some kind of testimonial injustice, 
both in their spoken and written contributions. There is also 
data suggesting that they are underrepresented in the main 
publications. If a philosopher’s philosophical competence 
and actual philosophical influence (measured by citation 
rates but also in a more general sense, by engagement of 
others with their work) is undermined by their perceived 
status as a non-native speaker, we can say that together 
with other kinds of discrimination (like the ones related 
to sex/gender and race/ethnicity) there is a non-native 
speaker problem corrupting much of our philosophical 
practice (at least in those philosophical communities 
in which English is nowadays the main language to do 
philosophy). The non-native speaker problem results in a 
community of practitioners that excludes several groups 
of people, including non-native speakers. This vice is not 
only bad for those who are excluded, but also for the 
philosophical enterprise itself, for we are excluding many 
voices from the pool of contributions that count as worth 
engaging and discussing, and this impoverishes the range 
and variety of considered ideas. 
Discrimination based on accent is difficult to resist and 
fight, in part due to a lack of public awareness, and in no 
less part due to a lack of institutional and legal tools to 
fight it. In the United States, for example, even though the 
law prohibits discrimination based on national origin,11 it 
does not say anything about accent, which often leaves 
victims of this kind of discrimination helpless in proving 
their case (Matsuda 1991; Nguyen 1993; Lippi-Green 
1994). Recognizing the “accent dimension” as a dimension 
of discrimination at the institutional level (different from, 
although intersecting with dimensions of ethnicity, race, 
sex, gender, ability, class, sexual orientation, and age) will 
help improve our personal and professional good practices. 
Acknowledging the “non-native condition” problem 
should motivate us philosophers to seek ways to improve 
the situation. I emphasize improvement as opposed to 
either seeking who or what to blame, or establishing a 
discrimination hierarchy. There is no benefit for anyone 
if we get stuck in victimizing or playing the “Oppression 
Olympics.” Although writing and presenting your work in a 
non-native language is often expensive in several senses 
(e.g., it takes longer to write, you need to ask natives for 
proof-reading, etc.), that would not by itself mean that 
the profession has a problem. The fact that professional 
philosophy excludes different groups of people constitutes 
the problem, and we should do something about it. 
I propose, as part of the list of good practices for our
profession, that we welcome exposure to foreign-accented
speech (which will increase our capacity to quickly adapt
to non-native philosophers speaking at conferences and
in classrooms; Sidaras, Alexander, and Nygaard 2009), and
maintain acute awareness of potential perception biases
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when we judge quality of work that reveals non-native
use of language. The very first step towards developing
good practices is to raise awareness about the “non-native
condition” in philosophy. This piece is my own attempt to
do just that,12 with the goal of improving not only diversity in
the profession but also the quality of the philosophy we do. 
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NOTES 
1.  Here I focus on the philosophical community that nowadays 
mostly works in English, as opposed to those that mostly work in 
other languages such as German, French, Chinese or others. 
2.  These effects have been documented in a number of countries. 
For example, in the United States Hispanic-accented English 
speakers are seen as less competent (Ryan and Carranza, 
“Ingroup and Outgroup Reactions Toward Mexican American 
Language Varieties,” in Language, Ethnicity, and Intergroup 
Relations, ed. H. Giles, 59–72 [London: Academic Press 1977]; 
Ryan, Carranza, and Moffie, “Reactions Toward Varying Degrees 
of Accentedness in the Speech of Spanish-English Bilinguals,” 
Language and Speech 20 [1977]: 267–73; Giles, Williams, 
Mackie, and Rosselli, “Reactions to Anglo- and Hispanic-
American-Accented Speakers: Affect, Identity, Persuasion, and 
the English-Only Controversy,” Language and Communication 15 
[1995]: 107–20) and less suitable for higher status occupations 
(de la Zerda and Hopper, “Employment Interviewers’ Reactions 
to Mexican American Speech,” Communication Monographs 
46 [1979]: 126–34); similar negative perceptions apply to 
English speakers with German (Ryan and Bulik, “Evaluations of 
Middle Class and Lower Class Speakers of Standard American 
and German-Accented English,” Journal of Language and 
Social Psychology 1 [1982]: 51–61), Malaysian (Gill, “Accent 
and Stereotypes: Their Effect on Perceptions  of Teachers and 
Lecture Comprehension,” Journal of Applied Communication 
Research 22 [1994]: 348–61), Chinese (Cargile, “Attitudes toward 
Chinese-accented Speech: An Investigation in Two Contexts,” 
Journal of Language and Social Psychology 16 [1997]: 434–43), 
or Korean accent (Lindemann, “Koreans, Chinese, or Indians? 
Attitudes and Ideologies about Nonnative English Speakers in 
the United States,” Journal of Sociolinguistics 7 [2003]: 348– 
64). Other countries where negative perceptions of non-native 
speakers were documented include the United Kingdom (Giles, 
“Evaluative Reactions to Accents,” Educational Review 22 [1970]: 
211–27), Canada (Munro, “A Primer on Accent Discrimination in 
the Canada Context,” TESL Canada Journal 20 [2003]: 38–51), and 
Australia (Nesdale and Rooney, “Evaluations and Stereotyping 
of Accented Speakers by Pre-Adolescent Children,” Journal of 
Language and Social Psychology 15 [1996]: 133–54). 
3.  In Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke (“The Impact of Gender on the 
Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants,” Sex Roles 41 
[1999]: 509–28), participants (academic psychologists) were 
asked to evaluate a curriculum vitae of a fictitious job applicant 
and decide whether they would hire the candidate. The CVs were 
identical with the exception of the applicant’s name: it was either 
a name typically given to men or to women. This manipulation of 
participants’ beliefs about the gender of the applicant revealed 
a clear gender bias: the evaluations of applicants’ teaching, 
research, and service record were higher for men than women 
with identical records. Men were also more likely to get hired 
than women (when the CV was characteristic of an average 
applicant in the field). 
4.  And according to the Reverse Linguistic Stereotyping hypothesis 
(Kang and Rubin, “Reverse Linguistic Stereotyping: Measuring 
the Effect of Listener Expectations on Speech Evaluation,” 
Journal of Language and Social Psychology 28, no. 4 [2009]: 
441–56), the identification of a speaker as a member of a group 
can distort listeners’ perception of speaker’s speech style and 
language proficiency. For example, categorizing a speaker as an 
immigrant or foreigner, or as a member of a more specific group 
(e.g., of Hispanic origin), might in turn distort perception of their 
speech. The studies reviewed in section one provide support for 
these claims. 
5.  Miranda Fricker already pointed out the possibility of non-
native speakers being subjected to testimonial injustice. Fricker, 
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 17. 
6.  Rubin provided relevant evidence of biased perception in the 
classroom affecting instructor evaluations: students’ assessment 
of teaching skills of a non-native speaker was predicted by 
their beliefs about accentedness (rather than the actual level of 
accent). Rubin, “Nonlanguage Factors Affecting Undergraduates’ 
Judgments of Non-Native English-Speaking Teaching Assistants,”
Research in Higher Education 33, no. 4 (1992): 511–31. 
7.  The reputation of these well-known schools is in general justified, 
but it is also often boosted for no good reason, by the mere 
functioning of the recognition heuristic we apply every time we 
think of institutions. The more we ignore and refuse to use and 
remember the names of foreign or small universities, the more 
weight we give to the few big-name schools, and the less likely 
other universities are to join the group of recognizable names. 
8.  This violation of readers’ and listeners’ expectations due to a 
peculiar usage of language is not necessarily something bad. 
Quite the opposite, it can on occasion be a source of literary 
pleasure, the pleasure of discovering richness of expression 
in new combinations of words. In the context of professional 
philosophy, however, these potentially enriching peculiar usages 
can be interpreted as interfering with content. 
9.  Depending on the kind of philosophy you do, there is a higher 
or lower pressure to transfer to the English language (e.g., 
if you want to publish, to be accepted into conferences, to 
have your work discussed). I am particularly concerned with 
the philosophical community working in English, in which the 
pressure is pretty high. 
10. How problematic this might be depends, of course, on what we 
mean by “in a clear way”; it is problematic if we require native 
accent as a requisite for clarity. 
11. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
12. In addition to existing awareness-raising resources, such as 
the new blog “What Is It Like To Be a Foreigner in Academia?” 
(https://beingaforeignerinacademia.wordpress.com) and 
Gabriele Contessa’s online report. 
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